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Abstract: A medical sensor network can wirelessly monitor vital signs of humans, mak-
ing it useful for long-term health care without sacriﬁcing patient comfort and mobility. For
such a network to be viable, its design must protect data privacy and authenticity given that
medical data are highly sensitive. We identify the unique security challenges of such a sensor
network and propose a set of resource-efﬁcient mechanisms to address these challenges. Our
solution includes (1) a novel two-tier scheme for verifying the authenticity of patient data,
(2) a secure key agreement protocol to set up shared keys between sensor nodes and base
stations, and (3) symmetric encryption/decryption for protecting data conﬁdentiality and in-
tegrity. We have implemented the proposed mechanisms on a wireless mote platform, and our
results conﬁrm their feasibility.
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1. Introduction
In our society, an increasing percentage of the population are aging people who have chronic illnesses
such as diabetes and heart disease. In addition, more children are suffering from long-term conditions
such as asthma and obesity. If these people’s health could be monitored continuously over a long pe-
riod of time, physicians could detect serious health problems sooner as well as provide more accurateSensors 2009, 9 6274
diagnoses and better treatment. For instance, previous studies have shown that monitoring patient data
can help with early detection of conditions like heart disease [1, 2]. Moreover, medical professionals
could react to situations such as strokes and asthma attacks more quickly. Current monitoring solutions,
however, are not suitable for long-term purpose, as patients are typically attached to a bedside device
that limits their mobility and comfort.
Several research groups (e.g., [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]) have recently integrated medical sensors with wireless
motes for health monitoring, such as the Harvard wireless pulse oximeter [4]. A mote is low-power
computing device with a wireless radio; it is typically the size of a match box or even smaller. Using
the motes, these medical sensors wirelessly transmit data to base stations, where it can be accessed by
physicians and nurses. This frees patients from the conﬁnement of traditional wired sensors, allowing
medical professionals to monitor their health remotely over long periods. Such medical sensor networks
can be deployed in hospitals, long-term care facilities, and homes. Pharmaceutical companies could also
use the network to monitor patients in clinical trials in order to develop better drugs. Moreover, the
system can be extended to monitor the vital signs of people working in hazardous conditions, such as
ﬁreﬁghters in a burning building, relief workers in a disaster area, and soldiers on a battleﬁeld.
Although medical sensor networks are extremely useful and versatile, the medical data they collect
is sensitive, and the privacy of such data is legally protected (e.g., the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) [8]). A patient’s physiological data may reveal what disease the pa-
tient has (which might be useful to parties such as insurance companies). As such, an attacker may proﬁt
ﬁnancially by selling data obtained through eavesdropping. Moreover, the attacker could even cause
physical harm to a patient by misreporting or spooﬁng the patient’s data, resulting in improper diagnosis
and/or treatment. Therefore, it would be irresponsible to design and deploy a medical sensor network
without adequate security mechanisms. Moreover, patients will not make use of this system if they are
not convinced that their data will be kept conﬁdential, regardless of how good the system’s performance
is. To this end, our work aims to design a secure medical sensor network for health monitoring. We
believe that security mechanisms must be designed into the architecture from day one rather than after
the other issues are addressed, as security requires careful thoughts on where functionality should be
placed and how the system components interact with one another.
Similar security issues may exist in some traditional wireless ad hoc networks and other types of
sensor networks. However, a medical sensor network monitors humans, unlike most existing sensor
networks that monitor the physical environment. A human-centered sensor network has distinct features
such as the sensitive nature of the data, the mobility of sensors, and the proximity to potential attackers,
all of which makes it difﬁcult to address security.
The contribution of our work is the following. First, we identify the security requirements and chal-
lenges in a medical sensor network. Second, we propose a security architecture for wireless motes-based
health monitoring based on the following security mechanisms: (1) a two-tier authentication scheme to
ensure the authenticity of patient data; (2) a secure key agreement protocol based on elliptic curve cryp-
tography (ECC) to set up symmetric keys between sensor nodes and base stations; and (3) symmetric
encryption and decryption for protecting data conﬁdentiality and integrity. Third, we have developed a
prototype on the Tmote Sky platform for evaluating the security, cost, and performance of the proposed
architecture and mechanisms. Note that our design could be applied in a variety of scenarios, e.g., hos-Sensors 2009, 9 6275
pitals, assisted living facilities, and homes. However, we use the terminology patient, physician, and
healthcare facility for simplicity.
2. Related Work
Several research projects have been developing prototype medical sensor networks, but to provide
a comprehensive security solution for medical sensor networks remains an open problem. The Code-
Blue [4] project at Harvard has proposed a mote-based sensor network platform and developed an
operational prototype for use in hospitals. The CodeBlue designers acknowledge the need for se-
curity in a medical environment, but addressing security requirements is not a main focus of their
study. They did develop an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) public-key implementation on Crossbow
motes [9], which is much less efﬁcient than later implementations.
The I-Living project [10] and PAS [11] propose an architecture to enable assisted living at home
for elderly citizens. Although they propose that the medical sensors use IEEE 802.11 or Bluetooth for
wireless communication, in contrast to the IEEE 802.15.4 radios often found on motes, the aims of the
project are very similar. The authors realize the need for privacy when dealing with patient data and
propose a symmetric security scheme, in which security information such as keys is stored in USB sticks
that are automatically recognized once plugged into a device. However, the scheme seems to require that
each device be individually conﬁgured, reducing its scalability.
ALARM-NET [6] shares many similarities with the above work, aiming to develop an architecture for
wireless monitoring of residents in assisted-living facilities. ALARM-NET combines wearable medical
sensors with static environmental sensors for measuring quantities such as temperature and light. Here,
the authors propose that security be provided via the symmetric Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
cipher, but they are not speciﬁc about key management.
Much of the aforementioned work has made impressive progress from a hardware perspective, in-
cluding development of custom medical sensors or integration of sensors with motes and other commu-
nication devices. Security has generally been covered separately and not as an integrated component of
the architecture. We feel our work is complementary to these efforts, as we focus on addressing security
concerns from an architectural standpoint.
There has been extensive research on wireless sensor security in general. Instead of enumerating
all the prior work in this area, we highlight several classes of approaches and explain why they cannot
be directly applied to long-term patient monitoring. Efﬁcient public-key schemes have been proposed
for mutual authentication between motes and base stations as well as the establishment of shared keys,
e.g., [12, 13]. However, these schemes often require each mote to have its own public key, which is
vulnerable to the physical compromise of motes (i.e., an attacker obtaining physical access to a mote)
as we explain later. Another efﬁcient approach to authentication is to use symmetric cryptography but
delay the disclosure of the symmetric keys, e.g., ¹TESLA [14]. This approach is not suitable for our
application because message authentication must be instantaneous to ensure timely reaction to patient
emergencies. Thus, we developed our own two-tier authentication scheme (detailed in Section 6) to
account for the unique characteristics of medical sensor networks.
A large body of work has been done on key pre-distribution using symmetric cryptography
(e.g., [15]). These schemes focus mainly on generating shared keys between sensor nodes. Often aSensors 2009, 9 6276
pre-conﬁgured secret key is used between the base station and each mote, which is not resilient against
physical compromise. In this paper, we choose ECC and asymmetric cryptography as the basis of our
key agreement protocol because recent work [9, 16, 17, 18] has shown that performing ECC public-key
computations on resource-constrained devices is viable. Several ECC-based key agreement protocols
have been proposed, including ECDH [19, 20] and ECMQV [20]. The authenticated versions of ECDH
and ECMQV both require a static public key on each mote, so they are not suitable in our system (due to
the aforementioned threat of physical compromise). Consequently, we developed our own ECC-based
key agreement protocol as detailed in Section 7.
3. Design Requirements
Our overall objective is to build a secure medical sensor network for health monitoring using low-
power wireless motes. To achieve this objective, the system needs to support long-term monitoring while
ensuring the privacy and authenticity of medical data. Below we elaborate on these three requirements.
First, patients with chronic diseases require long-term monitoring, which implies the following: (a)
the sensor nodes should ideally operate for days without recharging; and (b) during the lifetime of a
sensor node, it may be intentionally or accidentally turned off for various reasons, e.g. when it is out
of battery power, so the design should not rely on the assumption that the sensor nodes are always on.
These considerations have major inﬂuences on the design of our security mechanisms.
Second, since personal health data is extremely sensitive, a high conﬁdence on the system’s ability to
ensure data privacy is essential. From the healthcare providers’ point of view, a data breach would have
very serious legal and ﬁnancial consequences. From the users’ point of view, they may be hesitant to use
the system if they are not convinced that their data will be kept conﬁdential.
Third, data authenticity is very important in our system since healthcare providers rely on the data
to diagnose and treat their patients as well as react to emergencies. Patients’ lives can be endangered
if their data or commands from healthcare providers are intentionally changed or forged. Note that the
veriﬁcation of data authenticity has to be carried out as soon as data is received to ensure timely reaction
to emergencies.
Weemphasizethatourworkfocusesonkeepingpatientdatasecureasitistransferredtobasestations.
The problem of data security does not stop at that point; there are still issues such as ensuring that only
authorized personnel can view the data, and preventing accidental disclosure of the data. These areas are
outside the scope of this particular work. We note, however, that there has been work addressing these
issues; e.g., several variants of role-based access control (RBAC) schemes tailored for the healthcare
industry were surveyed in [21].
4. Unique Challenges
4.1. Hardware Constraints
We have chosen to use wireless motes (such as the Crossbow MICA [22] and the Moteiv Tmote
Sky [23]) as the sensor nodes in our design for several reasons. First, the motes are much smaller and
lighter than other types of portable embedded devices (e.g., PDAs), making them easier to carry. Second,
our speciﬁc application typically does not require complex data processing and has a low data transferSensors 2009, 9 6277
rate (e.g., 4 packets/second or less). As such, we need a device with a reasonable amount of computing
power and data transmission capability, while maintaining extremely low energy consumption during
sleep in order to support long-term monitoring. The Tmote Sky motes seem to have these characteristics,
making them well suited for our goals. Using motes also allows for ease of prototype development, as
the motes include an onboard CPU and enjoy the support of an active research community with a wealth
of open-source software and tools. We note that it is certainly possible that motes with higher power
CPUs could work (or even outperform the Tmote Sky) in our application, a point we plan to investigate
in the future.
Unfortunately, the resource constraints in wireless motes make it challenging to meet the above-
mentioned security requirements. Motes have much lower processor speed, memory, link bandwidth, and
energy supply than mobile PCs or PDAs, so our security mechanisms must be very resource-efﬁcient.
The MICA motes, for example, use an 8-bit, 8 MHz processor, and the comparable Tmote Sky platform
employs a 16-bit, 8 MHz processor. Conventional security mechanisms incur high costs; some RSA
operations can take over 80 seconds to run on a low-power 8-bit CPU [17]. In addition, the radio
bandwidths of recent IEEE 802.15.4-compliant motes are limited to 250 kbps.
4.2. Considerations for Medical Sensor Networks
Security mechanisms developed for other sensor networks or in general may not be applicable to
medical sensor networks due to their unique characteristics, as we explain below.
Communication Pattern sensor nodes on different patients do not communicate with one another.
Instead, they communicate with one or more base stations close to the healthcare provider. Therefore,
we need to protect the communication between the sensor nodes and base stations. However, most
existing research focuses more on enabling secure communication among sensor nodes. Often, a simple
symmetric-key mechanism is used between the sensor nodes and base stations, e.g., pre-conﬁguring a
shared secret in each sensor node and the base station. These mechanisms do not offer enough protection
against physical compromise of sensor nodes.
Threat Model physical compromise of sensor nodes is a greater threat in medical sensor networks due
to two factors: (1) mobility: while most other sensor networks have stationary sensors, medical sensors
move with the patients and may get lost without even being noticed; (2) accessibility: it is relatively
easy for attackers to ﬁnd targets, i.e., patients in local healthcare facilities, as opposed to in remote
locations such as forests or battleﬁelds. Note that physically compromising the base stations is harder
because they can be protected in secure locations. Once a sensor node is compromised, the attacker can
capture any sensitive information remaining in the mote, including personal medical data and secret key
material. The attacker can then use the key material to decrypt any previously recorded communication.
Furthermore, the attacker can inject false data using the node. Therefore, we need to limit the amount of
private information disclosed after the physical compromise as well as the damage that the attacker can
cause through impersonating the patient. This has several implications for our design: (1) secret keys
shouldbeperiodicallyupdated; (2)whenanodeisturnedoff, nosecuritymaterial(suchasasharedsecret
or a static public/private key) should have to be stored permanently in the node’s non-volatile memorySensors 2009, 9 6278
(a pre-conﬁgured shared secret obviously does not satisfy this requirement); and (3) authentication must
rely on something that the attacker cannot easily capture or forge.
5. Design Overview
Figure 1 illustrates our overall architecture. Each patient has one wireless mote attached to his/her
body. The mote is connected (wired) to several medical sensors, which take samples of the patient’s
health data when they are activated. A medical professional issues queries for a patient’s data through
one or a few base stations. Queries issued from base stations may activate the patient’s medical sensors
or adjust their sampling frequency and other parameters. Before sending the queries, the base station
veriﬁes that the medical professional is a legitimate user with the necessary privileges to access the par-
ticular patient’s data. After the mote receives the query from the base station, it activates the appropriate
sensor(s) or adjusts its parameters. It also continuously sends the resulting patient data from the sensors
to the base station until the sensors are deactivated. Wireless relay nodes forward the queries and patient
data between the base stations and the motes. Note that since our design focuses on securing the com-
munication between the motes and base stations, we do not consider the routing protocol used to transfer
data through the relay nodes.
Figure 1. Wireless health monitoring architecture.
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5.1. Architectural Decisions
We have made two explicit architectural decisions that differentiate our design from previously pro-
posed architectures such as CodeBlue [4]. These choices make it easier to secure the overall system,
without unduly sacriﬁcing the system’s functionality or performance.
First, the motes communicate only with the base stations, not with individual medical professionals’
computers. This is because in a large healthcare facility, it would be difﬁcult for the motes to directly
authenticate hundreds of individual users (physicians, nurses, etc.). The motes simply do not have theSensors 2009, 9 6279
memory resources to maintain all this access control information. Instead, our design authenticates the
users at the base stations and has the base stations issue queries to the motes on behalf of the users.
Motes are conﬁgured with the base stations’ addresses and public keys for authentication.
Second, motes do not have their own permanent public/private key pairs, because such a key pair
would have to be kept in non-volatile memory to prevent it from being lost when a mote is turned
off. Since individual motes are relatively easy to physically compromise, an attacker who captures a
mote would be able to decrypt all previously recorded data sent by the mote. Moreover, if the mote’s
public/private key pair is used for authentication, the attacker would be able to impersonate the patient
after capturing the mote.
5.2. Security Mechanisms
Our security mechanisms are summarized in Figure 2. First, we propose a two-tier authentication
scheme based on patient biometric and physiological data, in order to handle spooﬁng or physical com-
promise of motes. We assume that each mote is connected to a small ﬁngerprint scanner or a comparable
biometric identiﬁcation device. The base station ﬁrst veriﬁes the patient’s identity via a biometric signa-
ture, then checks incoming data against the patient’s proﬁle for consistency. Our authentication scheme
is resilient against spooﬁng and physical compromise of motes, because it is difﬁcult for an attacker to
both forge a valid patient’s biometric signature and generate physiological data that is consistent with
the patient’s own data.
Figure 2. Three security mechanisms.Sensors 2009, 9 6280
Second, queries and data are encrypted and integrity protected using dynamically generated symmet-
ric keys, in order to defend against attacks that compromise the privacy and integrity of patient data. As
mentioned earlier, motes are very resource-constrained, so it is more efﬁcient to use pairwise symmetric
keys shared between the base station and motes for data protection.
Third, we propose an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) based key agreement protocol to allow base
stations and motes to securely derive symmetric keys without any prior shared secrets. In order to handle
spooﬁng of base stations, motes are pre-conﬁgured with base stations’ public keys so that they can
establish symmetric keys only with valid base stations. If there are many base stations in the facility,
we can use the group public-key scheme proposed in [24]. This scheme allows each base station to
have its own private key, while allowing the motes to use a single public key for the entire base station
group. In the next three sections, we present the speciﬁc design, implementation, and evaluation of
each mechanism.
6. Two-Tier Data Source Authentication Scheme
An attacker can inject forged patient data into a medical sensor network using either his/her own
motes or a compromised mote. To combat this type of attack, we propose a two-tier data source
authentication scheme.
6.1. Design
Attheﬁrsttier, eachmoteisintegratedwithasmallbiometricscannertocaptureauniquesignaturefor
the patient. The biometric signature must be validated by a base station before communication between
the base station and mote can occur. We assume that the base stations have access to a list of valid
patient biometric signatures (this could be obtained from each patient upon admission to the facility),
and also that the space of possible signatures is sufﬁciently large that a brute-force attack is infeasible.
There are several off-the-shelf miniature ﬁngerprint readers and ﬁnger vein readers that could serve as
the biometric scanner. One example is the MBF200 solid-state ﬁngerprint sensor from Fujitsu [25] (also
shown in Figure 2). It is small (24 mm £ 24 mm £ 1.4 mm), low in power consumption (20 mA active,
< 200 ¹A sleep, 20 ¹A standby), and inexpensive (about $30 per unit in bulk quantities). Moreover, it
can capture a ﬁngerprint in less than one second. The ﬁngerprint sensor simply captures an image (which
would be inefﬁcient to transmit directly), but off-the-shelf hardware (e.g., [26]) exists that integrates the
Fujitsu sensor with a small processing board to allow feature extraction from the raw image.
The ﬁrst tier alone is insufﬁcient for ensuring data authenticity because an attacker can capture a
patient’s mote after the patient has been accepted into the system. Therefore, we add a second-tier
authentication system to assert the identity of a patient based solely on the sensor data being collected
from that patient. More speciﬁcally, each patient will wear the sensors for a short period of time for
the base station to “learn” the patient’s proﬁle. From then on, whenever the patient’s data deviates
substantially from that proﬁle, the base station will raise an alarm. The alarm could be caused by forged
data or by a medical emergency. In either case, it is important that the patient be checked on, so issuing
the alarm is warranted. This approach does not require any extra bandwidth (the data being used is sent
anyway) and is completely passive from the viewpoint of the patient.Sensors 2009, 9 6281
6.2. Implementation of Tier-2 Authentication
Our second-tier authentication mechanism requires statistical or machine learning techniques to rec-
ognize medical data as being from a particular patient. We have investigated a neural network approach
for implementing this mechanism. Each patient is associated with a neural network, which is ﬁrst trained
on data from that patient and some reference patients. The neural network then monitors incoming data
for consistency with the training data. Both the initial training and the detection mechanism are run on
the base station, in order to minimize computation on the mote. Once trained, the neural network can
quickly process incoming data.
We use a feed-forward neural network (Figure 3) that consists of a number of inputs, hidden cells,
and outputs, along with a set of connection weights that determine how the output is computed from
the input. Our current implementation uses patient electrocardiogram (ECG) signals to train the neural
network, due to the high amount of identifying features that this data offers. The input to the neural
network is one heartbeat of ECG data; the output is 0 or 1 (NO or YES) depending on whether the neural
network believes this data is consistent with the training data.
Figure 3. A generic three-layer feed-forward neural network.
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One issue with this approach is that raw ECG data for a single heartbeat can contain hundreds of
individual samples. Using this data in its entirety is impractically complex. To address this problem we
opted to extract a set of representative features from the raw ECG data to use as neural network inputs.
A typical ECG signal for a single heartbeat is shown in Figure 4; it consists of a smallP wave, followed
by a large QRS complex, followed by a small T wave. We extract eight features per heartbeat: the lengths
of the (1) PR interval, (2) PR segment, (3) QRS complex, (4) ST segment, and (5) QT interval; and the
peak amplitudes of the (6) P wave, (7) QRS complex, and (8) T wave.Sensors 2009, 9 6282
Figure 4. A typical ECG signal for a single heartbeat.
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6.3. Evaluation of Tier-2 Authentication
As we do not yet have access to real ECG sensors, we used publicly available data from the long-term
ST ECG database at MIT’s PhysioWeb [27] for developing our neural networks. Each patient’s ECG
data covers a period of 21–24 hours. We set aside some of these patients as a “reference set.” For each
of the remaining patients, a training data set was constructed consisting of the ﬁrst 2000 heartbeats from
that particular patient’s record (associated with a neural network output of 1) and the ﬁrst 2000 heartbeats
from each of the patients in the reference set (associated with a neural network output of 0).
We performed some experimentation with different neural network setups by varying the number of
reference patients used in training as well as the features extracted from each beat of ECG data. The
results in Table 1 suggest that increasing the number of reference patients potentially has the greatest re-
turns on performance. For subsequent experiments, we chose the setup with the best overall performance
for the training of each patient’s neural network, i.e., 9 reference patients and a four-layer feed-forward
neural network model with 8 input cells, 2 layers of 15 hidden cells, 1 output cell, and a log sigmoid
activation function on the hidden layers.
Table 2 shows how well the trained neural networks could classify the training data from 10 patients
(patients are labeled P1;:::P10, and reference patients are labeled R1;:::R9). The number corresponding
to (Pi, self) indicates the percentage of training samples (heartbeats) from patient Pi that were correctly
classiﬁed as from that patient. The number (Pi, Rj) indicates the percentage of training samples from
reference patient Rj that were correctly classiﬁed as not being from patient Pi. For example, the fourth
row of Table 2 indicates that (1) the trained network for patient P4 was able to correctly classify 99.85%
of the training inputs from P4 as being from P4 (the ﬁrst value); and (2) it was able to classify 100% of
the training inputs from reference patients R1, R2, R4:::R9, and 99.93% of the training inputs from R3,
as not being from P4. Overall, the neural networks learned the training data very well, with an average
accuracy of 99.8%.Sensors 2009, 9 6283
Table 1. Comparison of neural network setups.
Structure Features Ref. Patients Accuracy
8£20£1 8 5 69.79%
8£20£1 8 9 81.86%
14£20£1 14 5 80.07%
14£20£1 14 9 84.44%
8£15£15£1 8 9 91.31%
14£15£15£1 14 9 89.66%
Structure refers to the number of input, hidden, and output cells in the neural network.
Ref. Patients refers to the number of reference patients.
The accuracies provided represent the average validation accuracy over all patients.
Table 2. Neural network results on training data.
Patient Self R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9
P1 99.55 100 99.96 99.96 100 99.99 100 99.98 100 99.85
P2 99.95 100 100 100 100 99.99 100 100 100 100
P3 98.77 100 99.99 99.85 100 99.73 100 99.93 99.99 99.97
P4 99.85 100 100 99.93 100 100 100 100 100 100
P5 99.93 100 100 99.99 100 99.95 100 100 100 100
P6 99.27 100 100 99.77 99.99 99.9 100 99.91 99.99 100
P7 99.78 100 100 99.95 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.99 100 100
P8 99.42 99.98 100 99.78 100 99.74 100 100 99.99 99.99
P9 94.11 99.87 99.85 99.6 100 96.8 99.94 99.67 99.95 99.67
P10 95.07 99.94 99.78 99.8 99.95 97.9 100 99.49 99.93 99.65
Next, we use each trained neural network to classify the validation data (i.e., 10,000 heartbeats not
used in training) from each of the non-reference patients. As shown in Table 3, the neural networks
give accurate results in most cases. For example, the fourth row shows that patient P4’s neural network
was able to correctly classify the validation data from patients P1 through P6 and P8 through P10 almost
100% of the time, but was less accurate with P7. The average validation accuracy for the neural networks
over all patients was 87.7%.
To see how well these results might generalize, we also expanded the neural network training to a
larger set of data from the long-term ST database (26 patients P1 ... P26, with the same set of reference
patients R1 ... R9). We found that the overall effectiveness of the neural networks on the larger set wasSensors 2009, 9 6284
comparable to the ﬁgures presented here, with an average accuracy of 99.7% on the training data and
91.5% on the validation data. Due to space constraints we do not include the detailed results.
Table 3. Neural network results on validation data.
Patient P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
P1 93.85 98.74 99.55 51.82 99.44 83.5 87.97 86.12 80.65 95.05
P2 100 98.63 99.99 99.8 90.7 100 97.45 99.66 99.95 97.33
P3 62.75 99.91 85.86 95.29 91.17 69.97 99.67 76.05 85.71 93.12
P4 99.73 99.63 99.88 98.58 99.83 99.65 87.32 96.6 97.75 99.63
P5 99.83 82.85 97.77 99.84 91.41 98.66 99.99 93.72 98.54 98.78
P6 58.31 99.78 95.62 76.4 91.08 90.24 65.29 70.51 91.47 96.14
P7 99.95 93.62 99.98 78.2 98.82 93.97 82.67 99.92 99.61 99.6
P8 91.72 93.3 71.24 43.91 88.33 88 92.45 93.91 94.08 80.99
P9 14.68 99.94 98.14 26.52 92.51 87.26 86.35 80.59 79.96 75.46
P10 63.92 51.94 92.97 31.04 84.21 91.64 88.8 76.26 84.8 87.8
It is important to note that perfect classiﬁcation is not required at all in our scheme since our goal is
to detect suspicious data. We just need to raise an alarm when a certain percentage of incoming data
deviates from a patient’s proﬁle. The above results suggest that the alarm threshold can be set to a
relatively small number (e.g., 10–30%) with a low false positive and low false negative rate. In fact, with
a threshold of 25%, we would have 0 false positives and only 1 false negative (P1 could be considered
P9) in Table 3. One may further lower the threshold to reduce the false negative rate, with the possibility
of increasing the false positive rate. As long as the false positive rate is relatively low, this may be
a desirable trade-off: a false negative could have serious consequences, e.g., neglecting false data or
missing an emergency situation, while a false positive simply leads to a re-examination of the patient.
7. ECC-based Key Agreement Protocol
We propose a key agreement protocol that each mote uses to securely derive symmetric keys with the
base station at the beginning of their communication. We use elliptic curve cryptography.
7.1. Design
We ﬁrst present some background on ECC and then describe the design of our key agreement protocol
and key update protocol.
ECC Background
An elliptic curve is of the form y2 = x3 + ax + b. When deﬁned over a ﬁnite ﬁeld, all the points on
the curve (x;y) and the parameters a and b are limited to elements of the underlying ﬁeld. A commonSensors 2009, 9 6285
class of ﬁnite ﬁelds used in ECC are prime ﬁelds GF(p), where p is a large prime number; the elements
of this ﬁeld are the integers in [0;p ¡ 1]. There are three basic operations that can be performed on
elliptic curve points: addition of two points P +Q, doubling of a point (addition to itself) 2P, and scalar
multiplication nP, where n is an integer. Algebraic formulae exist for both addition and doubling. Scalar
multiplication is the repeated application of addition and doubling: nP = P + P + ::: + P for n times.
To use ECC, two nodes A and B agree on what elliptic curve to use and a base point G on the curve; this
information is not secret. Node A can generate a large random number q as its private key and derive its
public key Q by using Q = qG. If q is large, it is hard for an attacker to derive the private key q from the
public key Q even if the attacker knows G, due to the difﬁculty of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem (ECDLP).
We use the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES [19]), a public-key encryption
scheme based on DHIES [28], to secure the key agreement protocol messages between a mote and a
base station. DHIES (and ECIES) is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (see [28] for the
security proof). The ECIES procedure is summarized in Figure 5 and described below. To protect the
messages between node A (a mote) and node B (base station) against eavesdropping and modiﬁcation,
node A generates a random number r and computes a secret S = rQ, where Q is node B’s public key.
Node A then uses a key derivation function (KDF) to generate two transient keys from S: a symmetric
encryption key K
0
s and a MAC (message authentication code) key K
0
mac. Node A also computes the
point R = rG, which is sent in the clear to node B. Node B can derive the secret S using its private key
q and the point R: S = qR = q(rG) = r(qG) = rQ. Node B then uses the same KDF to derive K
0
s and
K
0
mac from S. The transient keys are then used to encrypt and integrity-protect the messages between A
and B.
Figure 5. The elliptic curve integrated encryption scheme (ECIES).
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public key: S = rQ
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Key Agreement Protocol
In our scheme, each base station has a private key q and a public key Q = qG, where G is a chosen
base point on the elliptic curve. The public key Q is pre-conﬁgured in the motes. As mentioned before,
motes do not have their own public/private keys. To securely derive symmetric keys between a mote and
a base station (called session keys), we use the following protocol involving three messages (Figure 6).Sensors 2009, 9 6286
Figure 6. ECC-based key agreement protocol.
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When a mote is ﬁrst attached to a patient, the patient uses the biometric scanner on the mote to
activate the key agreement protocol. For illustration, we assume that a ﬁngerprint reader is used to
obtain a biometric signature, but other types of biometric information would also work. Once the mote
obtains the patient’s ﬁngerprint (FP), which includes a set of features extracted from the raw ﬁngerprint
image, it generates a master key Km that will be used to derive the session keys for end-to-end query/data
encryption. It also generates a session number SN that uniquely identiﬁes this particular communication
session, and a nonce n1 for deriving the session keys. The mote then sends a KeyGenStart message
securely to the base station using ECIES. This message contains the mote’s ID (NID), the patient’s
FP, the master key Km, the session number SN, and the nonce n1. Appended to KeyGenStart is the
unencrypted point R needed for ECIES.
The base station decrypts KeyGenStart and veriﬁes the authenticity of this patient using the ﬁnger-
print. Then the base station generates a nonce n2, and it uses Km, n1, and n2 to derive the session
keys that will be shared with the mote — the symmetric encryption key Ks and the MAC key Kmac for
data/query transfer. The nonces n1 and n2 not only allow frequent update of the session keys, but also
protect the protocol from replay attacks. Note that our protocol is also secure against man-in-the-middle
attacks because the attacker would need the base station’s private key and the patient’s FP to launch
such an attack.
After processing the KeyGenStart message, the base station sends back a KeyGenAck message to the
mote containing SN, n2, and a one-way hash of n1, encrypted and integrity-protected using the transient
keys derived from ECIES. We opt to use a hash of n1 rather than n1 directly to reduce the information
that an attacker will have even if the attacker is able to decrypt this message.
The mote decrypts KeyGenAck and veriﬁes SN and the hash of n1 to prevent replay attacks. After-
wards, the mote uses Km, n1, and n2 to derive the session keys Ks and Kmac, which should match those
generated by the base station. For the base station to verify that the mote has received the KeyGenAck
message and that the mote generated the session keys Ks and Kmac correctly, the mote sends a Key-
GenVerify message to the base station containing SN and a hash of n2. This message is encrypted withSensors 2009, 9 6287
Ks and integrity-protected with Kmac. The base station decrypts KeyGenVerify and veriﬁes that all the
values are correct. If so, data transfer may commence using Ks to encrypt/decrypt messages and Kmac
to compute a keyed MAC for each message.
Our key agreement protocol differs from the handshakes in SSL/TLS in the following ways: (1)
we use only three protocol messages to set up the session keys, as message transmissions consume a
signiﬁcant amount of energy; (2) since motes do not have their own public/private keys, we incorporate
the patient biometric signature in KeyGenStart as a means of authenticating the mote to the base station;
(3) the nonces are encrypted in our protocol for more protection; and (4) in addition to the patient
biometric signature, we have several other built-in measures to limit what an attacker can do with a
compromised mote, as discussed below.
Key Update Procedure
The base station and the mote periodically update the session keys Ks and Kmac to limit the amount
of private data that can be recovered in case the keys are compromised. To update the session keys,
they simply exchange new values of n1 and n2 and rerun the key derivation function using the existing
master key Km and the new nonce values. This allows the session keys to be updated without having to
undertake the expensive public-key operations in the full key agreement protocol. We omit the details
due to space constraints.
Further Considerations for Physical Compromise of Motes
We enhance the above mechanisms with the following measures to limit what an attacker can do with
a compromised mote. Suppose that an attacker has been eavesdropping on the communication between
the mote and the base station. We have two measures to bound the amount of private information
that the attacker can recover from earlier captured sensor data. First, once the key update procedure
produces a new session key, the previous session’s keys (Ks, Kmac) and nonces (n1, n2) are erased from
memory. Therefore, the attacker can only decrypt the data that has already been sent in the current
session. Second, if the base station and the mote have not communicated for a long period of time (e.g.,
if the patient removes the mote or if the mote is inadvertently lost), the master key Km and its derived
keys expire and are removed from memory. The attacker will not obtain any session keys in this case.
Note that when the master key expires, the entire key agreement protocol must be re-run to resume
communication between the mote and base station. The idle time before Km expires can be tuned to
ﬁt speciﬁc security needs, with a shorter idle time providing added security at the expense of greater
patient inconvenience (since the biometric security procedure would have to be reactivated) and greater
computational load for key agreement.
Suppose that the attacker wants to send forged data using the mote. If the mote has been idle for
too long and the master key has expired, the attacker needs to use a valid ﬁngerprint to activate the key
agreement protocol. To prevent this from happening, we remove FP from the mote’s memory as soon as
the KeyGenAck message is received, so it is difﬁcult for an attacker to obtain a valid patient’s biometric
information. On the other hand, if the master key is still valid, the attacker can use the current session
key and establish new session keys through the key update procedure. However, the attacker will mostSensors 2009, 9 6288
likely be detected by the base station via the second-tier authentication scheme, as the forged patient data
will not match the existing proﬁle.
7.2. Implementation of Key Agreement Protocol
Our development environment is TinyOS 2 [29] running on the Moteiv Tmote Sky platform, which
features a 16-bit, 8 MHz Texas Instruments MSP430 processor with 48 KB of program ROM and 10
KB of RAM. Program code in this environment is written in nesC (networked embedded systems C), a
dialect of C designed for use with TinyOS. (As of late 2007, Moteiv has changed its name to Sentilla and
has discontinued production and support of its Tmote product line in favor of a new hardware platform
designed for Java applications. However, the new platform is backwards-compatible with the Tmote Sky.
Furthermore, Crossbow Technology still offers its TelosB mote for sale, which is functionally identical
to the Tmote Sky. Both the TelosB and Tmote Sky remain popular in the research community.)
Our basic ECC operations are based on North Carolina State University’s TinyECC 1.0
distribution [16]. We implemented ECIES for secure key agreement, using the elliptic curve secp160r1
deﬁned over a 160-bit prime ﬁeld as recommended by [30]. We use 160-bit private keys, 320-bit pub-
lic keys, and a 160-bit random number r in ECIES. We then implemented our key agreement protocol,
using a 32-bit session number (SN), 48-bit patient ﬁngerprint (FP), 128-bit master key (Km), 128-bit
transient and session keys (K
0
s, K
0
mac, Ks, Kmac), and 64-bit nonces (n1, n2). The resulting KeyGenStart,
KeyGenAck, and KeyGenV erify messages are 56, 52 and 32 bytes long.
Due to its customizability and ease of implementation, we chose the RC5 block cipher in cipher-
text stealing (CTS) mode for the symmetric encryption in ECIES, using the recommended parameters
of 64-bit blocks, 128-bit keys, and 12 rounds. For the hash function we chose SHA-1 [31], which al-
lowed us to save code space by using SHA-1 based algorithms for both the message authentication code
function (for integrity checking) and key derivation function. We implemented HMAC-SHA-1 [32] and
PBKDF1 [33], respectively.
7.3. Evaluation of Key Agreement Protocol
Our compiled code on the Tmote uses 30 KB of ROM and 4.4 KB of RAM, which leaves reasonable
space for other applications. We note that most of this memory requirement comes from TinyECC,
which includes numerous optimizations to speed up the ECC operations. As indicated by Liu and
Ning [16], these optimizations can be selectively disabled to reduce the code size at the cost of increased
computation time.
We timed our protocol which ran on two motes and had a laptop PC (2.66 GHz Intel Pentium 4) as
a base station. As illustrated in Figure 7, mote A acts as a sender, while mote B serves as the interface
between the sender and the PC by receiving A’s wireless packets and forwarding them over a serial
connection (emulated via a physical USB connection). Mote B essentially serves as a bridge between
the sending mote and the PC, as the PC lacks a native way of wirelessly receiving data from a mote.
Mote A took 7075 ms to generate and send KeyGenStart, and 123 ms to check KeyGenAck and send
KeyGenVerify. The base station took 77 ms to check KeyGenStart and send KeyGenAck, and 13.3 ms to
check KeyGenVerify. Virtually all of the time required to generate and send KeyGenStart is due to twoSensors 2009, 9 6289
ECC scalar point multiplications (computing the points rQ and rG, as described previously).
Figure 7. Experimental setup with two motes and a PC.
Mote A Mote B PC
Base Station
Wireless Serial
Although a CPU time investment of over 7 s may seem intensive, we note that the key agree-
ment protocol only has to be run once to establish the initial symmetric keys, and once each time the
keys expire. We explain in Section 8.5 that this periodic investment has minimal effect on the mote’s
battery life.
8. Query/Data Protection Mechanism
Queries and data are encrypted and integrity-protected using the session keys established through the
key agreement protocol. To prevent replay or injection of messages, we use both a session number (SN)
and a message sequence number in query and data messages. The session number is randomly changed
whenever the keys are updated (if the master key has expired, the session number is re-generated by the
sending mote as part of re-running the entire key agreement protocol; if only the session keys are being
updated, the session number is updated via the nonce exchange procedure). The base station needs to
keep a list of recently used session numbers in order to detect replay attacks. This list can be stored
efﬁciently using a bloom ﬁlter. The base station and the mote also increase their message sequence
numbers for each new query or data message. Received messages with an unexpected session number or
sequence number are discarded. Note that it is difﬁcult for an outside attacker to guess a session number
in the ﬁrst place.
To save code space, we use the same symmetric cipher and MAC function in the query/data protection
mechanism as in the key agreement protocol discussed previously (RC5 in ciphertext stealing mode and
HMAC-SHA-1, respectively).
8.1. Overhead of Symmetric Encryption/MAC
To get an idea of the performance impact of performing symmetric encryption/MAC on every data
packet, we conducted a simple experiment in which mote A (see Figure 7) sent 2000 packets over
the air as rapidly as possible. We varied the packet size from 40 bytes to 100 bytes (near the upper
limit of packet size for our platform) and measured the throughput of the system. As illustrated in
Figure 8, using encryption and integrity checking does lower the throughput from 31–53 kbps to 8–14
kbps (depending on packet size). We also directly measured the time required to perform the MAC and
encryption operations on a single 100-byte packet and we found that this consumes about 44 ms of CPU
time. However, we feel that this is a reasonable price to pay for the added security. Moreover, the lower
throughput is still sufﬁcient for a practical deployment, as we explain later.Sensors 2009, 9 6290
Figure 8. Throughput as a function of packet size and encryption.
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8.2. Simulated Real-World Deployment
We then set up a more realistic network with multiple senders and one receiving mote, with a ﬁxed
sending rate of four 100-byte packets per second (both encryption and MAC are enabled). We chose this
sending rate (400 bytes/s per patient) based on the following considerations. The ECG data in the long-
term ST database was sampled at 250 Hz. Allotting 2 bytes for each sample, this results in 500 bytes
per second of raw data. However, we found that 500 bytes of raw ECG data can be reduced to about
260 bytes using S-LZW [34], a compression scheme speciﬁcally designed for the resource constraints
of wireless motes. Compression would thus allow ample space for ECG data as well as other types of
patient data to be sent. Note that other patient data (e.g., body temperature) could be sampled at a much
lower rate than the ECG data.
Figures 9 and 10 show the throughput and packet loss as measured at the receiving mote (mote B
in Figure 7) and at the PC. Any difference between the two curves in each ﬁgure indicates that packets
were dropped by the serial connection between the receiving mote and the PC. We found that a single
receiving mote is able to reliably handle 10 senders, with a packet loss of under 1%. At 11 senders and
above, the receiving radio is unable to keep up with the incoming packets.
Figure 9. Aggregate throughput at receiving mote and PC as a function of the number of
senders (sending rate = 4 packets/sec).
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Figure 10. Packet loss at receiving mote and PC as a function of the number of senders
(sending rate = 4 packets/sec).
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8.3. Stress Test
For the stress test, we modiﬁed the senders to send 100-byte packets with MAC/encryption as quickly
as possible, at about 17 packets per second. Note that in practice the senders are unlikely to send
their sampled data at such a high rate, due to energy consumption concerns. We wanted to evaluate
this scenario solely to see how the system would perform at its hardware limits. Figures 11 and 12
show the throughput and packet loss. These two ﬁgures demonstrate that a single receiving mote is
able to reliably handle data from up to 4 senders sending at their maximum rate. Beyond this point,
the receiving radio is unable to keep up with the incoming packets, resulting in signiﬁcant packet loss.
Additionally, when there are more than 4 senders, the serial connection between mote B and the PC also
becomes a bottleneck, resulting in a higher loss rate observed at the PC than at the receiving mote. To
address the radio packet loss issues, we attempted using the PacketLink reliable transmission layer in
TinyOS. However, we found that this further lowered throughput as the high loss rate resulted in many
retransmissions. Overall, we feel that the MAC layer being used in TinyOS can be improved to more
gracefully handle high loads; we plan to further investigate this in the future.
Figure 11. Aggregate throughput at receiving mote and PC as a function of the number of
senders (maximum possible sending rate).
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Figure 12. Packet loss at receiving mote and PC as a function of the number of senders
(maximum possible sending rate).
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8.4. Improving Base Station Scalability
The above results may seem to suggest that a single base station can support only a very small number
of sending motes. However, the number of motes reliably handled by a base station can be improved
signiﬁcantly simply by attaching more than one receiving mote (mote B in Figure 7) to the PC. Each
receiving mote is set to a different wireless channel and handles incoming packets only from motes
sending on that channel. To demonstrate the feasibility of this approach, we repeated the above stress
test with two and three receiving motes. As shown in Figure 13, we found that the base station’s ability
to handle multiple sending motes scales very well with the number of receiving motes attached. The
overall throughput increases linearly with additional receiving motes. With four senders per receiver,
for instance, a single receiving mote allows a throughput of about 46.9 kbps; this increases to 93.0 kbps
and 142.9 kbps for two and three receiving motes, respectively. We also observed that the packet loss
remains low (on the order of 1%) with the additional receiving motes.
Figure 13. Aggregate throughput at PC as a function of the number of senders and receivers
(maximum possible sending rate).
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8.5. Energy Considerations
A complete energy proﬁle for the sending mote must consider the processor, the radio, and the at-
tached medical sensors. Of these components, the processor is used heavily during the initial ECC oper-
ations and in the encryption/MAC of outgoing packets. As discussed previously, the ECC key agreement
consumes 7198 ms of CPU time on the mote, while performing encryption/MAC on a single 100-byte
packet consumes 44 ms of time.
The radio and the sensors are used periodically to sample patient data and forward it to the base
station. Based on the previous experiments, the time required for the radio to send a single a 100-byte
packet is about 15 ms. In addition to the radio, the mote’s batteries would have to be used to power the
attached biometric scanner and medical sensors. Because we have not yet integrated these sensors onto
our motes, it is difﬁcult for us to quantify their energy requirements. However, we note that the scanner
is needed only once each time the key agreement protocol is run. Meanwhile, the medical sensors do not
have to be continuously working; they might operate in a low-power sleep mode, being activated only
when required to sample the patient’s data.
To get a rough estimate of energy consumption in a real-world deployment, we made the following
assumptions: (1) the ECC key agreement protocol will be run once per 24 hours; and (2) the mote will
send patient data at the rate of four 100-byte packets per second. The Tmote Sky draws 5.1 ¹A with the
processor on standby and radio off, 1.8 mA with the processor alone on, and 19.5 mA with the processor
on and the radio transmitting [23]. For the envisioned processor/radio usage, the mote’s AA batteries
(using a conservatively low estimate of 500 mAh) would be sufﬁcient for about 14 days of operation.
The majority (78.5%) of the power requirement comes from the radio, with 21.2% from CPU use during
encryption/MAC and less than 1% from CPU use during the ECC key setup and idling.
9. Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented the design and implementation of a comprehensive security solution for medical
sensornetworks. OurinitialresultsonthepatientauthenticationusingECGdataarepromising, whileour
implementation on the Tmote Sky demonstrates reasonable computational overhead for our mechanisms.
Our future plans include improvements to both the theoretical and implementation aspects of the
system. We have not yet addressed some security requirements that would be important in an actual
deployment. In particular, these security issues deserve attention:
Base stations - Our work assumes that the base stations in the architecture are secure. Although we
feel that base stations are less likely than motes to be compromised, we should nonetheless develop a
contingency plan should an attacker gain access to one or more base stations. Furthermore, we currently
assume that base stations’ public keys are pre-conﬁgured in the patient motes. However, we have not yet
developed a scheme to allow scalable and secure updates to these public keys.
Denial-of-service attacks - An attacker may simply ﬂood the wireless channel with meaningless
transmissions, rendering the motes unable to send any data. Some work has already been done on
addressing DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks; Raymond and Midkiff [35] provide a survey. We
hope to integrate some techniques from the literature into our system.Sensors 2009, 9 6294
Attacks on the relay nodes - Rather than targeting base stations or patient motes, an attacker might
focus on the relay nodes in the system. This might include conducting a DoS attack against or physically
capturing relay nodes, both of which would result in a routing “black hole” in the system. We note that
this might be addressed by selecting an appropriate ﬂexible routing protocol, which (as mentioned in
Section 5) we do not consider in this work.
Random number generation - In our scheme, the session keys are derived from a secret S = rQ,
where Q is the public key of the base station and r is a random number generated by the sending mote.
Even with no knowledge of r itself, an attacker who physically captures a mote might gain knowledge
of the seed used to generate r. To combat this, we might have the sending mote use patient biometric
data in the random number generation, but this is not yet something that we have analyzed in detail.
Implementation-wise, we plan to evaluate the base station’s neural network mechanism using live
data streams from the motes, optimize our neural network performance, integrate motes with actual
medical sensors and ﬁngerprint readers, and possibly consider a more powerful mote platform such as
the Intel iMote2. The iMote2’s processor is about an order of magnitude faster than that of the Tmote
Sky, which may potentially result in a more efﬁcient system (as the processor can quickly perform its
work and resume a low-power sleep mode). Ultimately, we hope to conduct a study on actual patients to
demonstrate the real-world feasibility of our system. Even further in the future, we may consider using a
body sensor network (which can include implanted as well as wearable wireless sensors) on the patient
rather than connecting all sensors to a single mote.
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